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Online advertising is currently the greatest source of rev-
enue for many Internet giants. The increased number of
specialized websites and modern profiling techniques, have
all contributed to an explosion of the income of ad brokers
from online advertising. The single biggest threat to this
growth, is however, click-fraud. Trained botnets and even
individuals are hired by click-fraud specialists in order to
maximize the revenue of certain users from the ads they
publish on their websites, or to launch an attack between
competing businesses.
In this note we wish to raise the awareness of the network-
ing research community on potential research areas within
this emerging field. As an example strategy, we present Bluff
ads; a class of ads that join forces in order to increase the
effort level for click-fraud spammers. Bluff ads are either
targeted ads, with irrelevant display text, or highly relevant
display text, with irrelevant targeting information. They act
as a litmus test for the legitimacy of the individual clicking
on the ads. Together with standard threshold-based meth-
ods, fake ads help to decrease click-fraud levels.
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Spending on Internet ads is growing faster than any other
sector of the advertising industry and is expected to surge
from $12.5 billion last year to $29 billion in 2010 in the U.S.
alone, according to researcher eMarketer Inc. This trend is
similar on the revenue form Internet activities when com-
pared to the downfall of transit charges for example [5].
Most academics and consultants who study online adver-
tising estimate that 10% to 15% of ads in pay per click
online advertising systems are not authentic.1 The clicks
are believed to be instantiated by users in poor countries,
or botnets, who are trained to click on specific ads. This
process is called click-fraud.
Click fraud is the subject of some controversy and in-
creasing litigation due to the advertising networks being a
key beneficiary of the fraud. On one hand, the brokers do
1http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_40/b4003001.htm
not wish to lose customers. On the other hand, they are
not able to provide full details of the clicks, their rates, and
origin IP addresses to advertisers. Even worse, the adver-
tisers would wish to claim that all clicks are fraud, hence
avoiding click charges. For instance, broker loses money to
undetected click fraud when it pays out to the publisher
(third party website), but it makes more money when it col-
lects fees from the advertiser. Because of the spread between
what the broker collects and what it pays out, click fraud
may directly profit the broker. This also provides an incen-
tive for the publishers to hire click fraud botnets or human
teams to increase their revenue.
Brokers claim they filter out most questionable clicks and
either not charge for them or reimburse advertisers that have
been wrongly billed. However this is a hard task, despite
the claims that brokers’ efforts are satisfactory [7]. On its
simplest form, a weblog publisher continuously clicks on the
ads displayed on his own website in order to make revenue.
In a more complicated scenario, a hardware store may hire
a large, globally distributed botnet in order to click on its
competitors ads, hence depleting their daily budget.
Another form of such fraud is view-fraud. In this case, a
blogger may hire a botnet to continuously access its pages
and retrieve ads without clicking on them, in long term gen-
erating revenue from ad impressions (views). Although the
views are much cheaper than clicks, a high view to click ratio
will usually affect the ad quality score and will drop the ad
from the top spots, as the broker is interested in ads which
generate clicks and bring in more revenue.
Detecting click fraud is a relatively new area of research.
On the simplest form, the broker performs threshold-based
detection. If a web page is receiving a high number of clicks
from the same IP address in a short interval, these clicks can
be flagged as fraud. This gets more complicated if the click-
ers are behind proxies or globally distributed. In such cases
the broker has to use global IP blacklists and continually
update its list as the botnets evolve.
In this paper we present Bluff Ads, a set of ads which are
designed to be detected and clicked only by machines, or
poorly trained click-fraud work force. These ads are targeted
at the same audience profile as the other ad groups, however
their displayed text is totally unrelated to the user profile.
Hence they should not be clicked on by the benign user.
This simple set of ads, mixed with ordinary ads, work as
a litmus test, or a “Captcha” for the user legitimacy. If
a high number of them is clicked, the user is deemed to
be flagged as suspicious. Another form of Bluff ads is a set













Figure 1: Targeted keyword-based advertising.
specific profile and are randomly displayed. This group help
detect click-fraud when the botnet builds up fake profile in
order to harvest relevant ads.
We wish to insist that Bluff ads are, by no means, the
ultimate defense against click-fraud. In fact this paper is a
report on the status quo on click-fraud and detection mech-
anisms which raise the bar for attackers. We wish to in-
spire the network security and research community as a
whole to pursue further research on advertising, release more
datasets (such as Yahoo! Webscope data2) and devise strate-
gies for privacy preserving advertising which also minimize
click fraud.
2. INTERNET TARGETED ADVERTISING
BASICS
We define four major components of advertising systems:
advertisers, publishers, clients, and brokers.
Advertisers wish to sell their products or services through
ads. Publishers (e.g., personal weblogs) provider opportu-
nities to view ads, for instance by providing space for ad
banners. Clients are the computers that show publisher
web pages and ads to users. Brokers (e.g., Google or Ya-
hoo!) bring together advertisers, publishers, and clients.
They provide ads to users, gather statistics about what ads
were shown on which publisher pages, collect money from
the advertisers, and pay the publishers.
Figure 1 illustrates the most popular advertising model on
the Internet today. The advertisers specifies their ads and
bids (how much the advertiser is willing to pay for views and
clicks of the ads) to the broker. When a publisher provides
banner space to the client on a web page, a request goes
to the broker asking to fill in the banner space with an ap-
propriate ad. The provider makes the decision as to which
ads to place based on a number of criteria such as the key-
words for the web page, personalization information about
the client (usually persistent cookies on client machine), the
keywords of the ad, and the bid associated with the ad. It
then delivers the ad to the client, informs the advertiser
of the ad view and clicks, and charges the advertisers and
compensates the publishers accordingly.
2http://webscope.sandbox.yahoo.com/
3. CLICK FRAUD SCENARIOS
Traditionally, online advertisers used the Cost-Per-Impression
(CPI) model to charge for advertisements. The CPI is often
measured in terms of the cost of one thousand impressions
of the ad. These ads can be videos, images and links. Re-
cently, search engines such as Google have given rise to the
Pay-Per-Click (PPC) model for online advertising. In this
type of arrangement, advertisers pay a certain amount of
money to the publisher for every click on their ad (which
leads to the advertiser’s website). This model has however
led to the rise of click fraud where users, or a botnet of
computers fraudulently click on the ads in order to generate
revenue for the publisher in an undetectable manner. Anu-
pam et al. [1] present a study on difficulty of detecting such
attacks which demonstrates the difficulty of detecting click
frauds. A deceitful publisher puts a script on his website
that is automatically downloaded onto a visitor’s computer
when said visitor goes to the publisher’s website. The script
then imitates a click onto the advertisement leaving the vis-
itor none the wiser. The log files of the advertiser (and, if
applicable, of the publisher) will show the visitor’s IP ad-
dress.
Other forms of click fraud include Competitors of adver-
tisers, vandalism fans and friends of the publisher.3
It is quite hard for a botnet to launch a widely distributed
clicking campaign realistically. The brokers have profiles
of where an advertisers’ benign clickers come from, when,
and how often they click. The botnet has to match this
profile to avoid detection based on thresholds. The Bluff ads
presented in this paper are means for detecting the nodes of
a trained botnet.
Some frauds are just out of anger. In response to Google’s
recently announced plans to expand the tracking of users,
the international anti-advertising magazine Adbusters pro-
poses that users collectively embark on a civil disobedience
campaign of intentional, automated click fraud in order to
undermine Google’s advertising program in order to force
Google to adopt a pro-privacy corporate policy. They have
released a GreaseMonkey script that automatically clicks on
all AdSense ads.4
4. DETECTING CLICK FRAUD
The basic architecture for fraud detection is explained be-
low and we will expand on different use cases in this sections.
For fraud detection, we add some Bluff adverts to the
ads displayed to the user. These are real ads, but served
randomly. The Bluff ads must not have a high portion of
the ads. Every time the user visits a publisher page, we
serve the user with probability p(i) with profiled ads, and
with probability [1− p(i)] with other, non related Bluff ads.
The brokers’ entire advertising model is based on the idea
of showing only the most relevant ad content. If displayed
ads are poisoned with context-free ads on a frequent basis,
benign users will perceive this as the broker doing a poor
job at finding relevant ads. Hence, the Bluff/real ratio must
be set in a way that the user’s browsing experience and ad
quality perception is not greatly affected. For example, a
user living in Iran should not ideally be presented with spe-
cial offer ads on beer during Oktoberfest. However, it is not
3See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Click_fraud for a
detailed description
4http://yro.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=09/03/12/2139258&from=r
unreasonable, if he is shown car adverts, when his profile
has no indication of his interests in driving. In practice,
the Bluff ads should be authentic ads of different advertis-
ers, spread in the network and shown randomly, but never
charged for.
The Bluff ads serve two purposes, one, is the psychological
affect, they give the user “comfort” that he is not being
watched too closely and monitored too deeply, the second,
and more important, purpose is to identify fraud clickers and
eliminate them from the system. These fraud agents are just
clicking for publishers, or against a specific advertiser.
4.1 Using Bluff ads
We now address different forms of click-fraud attacks and
those on user privacy, and we briefly describe how the Bluff
ads will help minimize them.
4.1.1 Profiling the customer
The Bluff ads will prevent the publishers and advertis-
ers from narrowly targeting the client as it is not possible
to know whether the ad viewed was a Bluff or not. Unless
the publishers work in large groups together which will also
increase the difficulty level for them. The advertisers can
naturally profile users easier, however that is not avoidable
as ultimately it is the users interest which lead to revenue
generation for the advertiser and broker. If the broker no-
tices that a specific web page covers many categories it can
ignore that website altogether. In the case of content aggre-
gators the broker can put specific emphasis on pages visited
during clients browsing session.
4.1.2 Publisher fraud
The most common case is where a publisher has hired
a large botnot to perform clicks for it. This can be eas-
ily realized from the frequency of the clicks. In this case
the publisher ID and the Bluff/real ratio for publishers can
inform the broker of this attack. If the Bluff/real ratio is
higher than an average user, it is indicative of a bot being
in operation.
4.1.3 Attacks on advertisers
These can again be identified by the a combination of
simple threshold sampling and Bluff/real ratio of the ads. If
most of the clicks from a host are targeted towards a single
advertiser, there will be an obvious trend in their Bluff/real
ratio. If the attacker decides to poison the statistics by click-
ing on random other ads, the ratio will be affected again.
Many large advertisers today use specialized agencies to
monitor their incoming traffic and identify spammers and
click-fraud users, who tend to visit often but spend no time
on the advertiser website. These users are also identifiable if
they come from same IPs with frequent visit counts (simple
threshold detection). The advertiser agents can hence pass
a list of fraud suspects to the broker. They can be then
removed form the billing system.
4.1.4 Attacks on publisher
These are the most difficult attacks, when a publisher is
under attack form another source. Such attacks happen
when reliable publishers who use brokers, such as CNN, are
under attack in order to damage their relationships with the
advertisers and providers and ultimately eject them from the
competition scene. it is possible to detect such attacks by
examining the Bluff/real ratio for the ad and publisher pair
and identify these if the frequency of views/clicks is less than
a certain time threshold. Distributed attack on publishers
are a new form of attack and we have not explored the range
of solutions available for detecting these in details.
4.2 Simple experiment
Set targeting age Bluff? Views Clicks
1 18-25 - 264 2
2 18-25 YES 140 0
3 Over 25 0 0
4 Over 25 YES 0 0
Table 1: Views and clicks for different ads
In this part we present the results of a simple experi-
ment to analyze the behavior of authentic users when pre-
sented with Bluff ads. We prepared four sets of ads using the
Google Adwords Program5, targeting UK females with key-
words related to traveling to Asia. In the authentic advert
texts, we mention that the travel services are specifically for
female travelers between 18-25. For the bluff ads, we used
the same targeting range, but used unrelated text about In-
ternet routing in the ad text. In set 3 and set 4 of ads, we
changed the targeting age, while keeping the ads the same as
set 1 and 2, respectively. We ran the experiment for 3 weeks
on Google Ads, on all days and hours, with even rotation
and budget between the ads. We only wished to focus on the
benign user reaction to Bluff ads. Hence to avoid attract-
ing botnets we only set the advert to be displayed on Google
search results pages. In this way, we avoided publisher fraud
cases from biasing our ad clicks and views.
The results in Table 1 strongly support our intuition, in
that when the ad text is not relevant to the audience (set 2)
there is a lower number of views and clicks. Due to Google’s
ranking system for ad quality factor, there are less views in
set 2 than set 1. set 3 and 4 represent a different set of
Bluff ads, where the text of ad (in set 3) was relevant to the
keywords, but the target profile (those aged 18-25) where
not the ones who were targeted by the ad text. In this case
the ad should have never been even viewed, in presence of a
good profiling scheme, such as the one in place by Google. If
the ad as such is viewed or clicked by any user, it raises the
concern of that user being part of a fraud case. This simple
experiment provides basic evidence on reaction of authentic
users facing Bluff ads or ads which are not directly relevant
to them.
5. RELATED WORK
There are a number of solutions for avoiding click fraud
and performing better advertisement. One suggestion is to
charge based on user’s actions, i.e., the publisher gets a pre-
mium only after the successful conversion of the ad, meaning
the user’s visit to the advertiser website and performing an
action such as buying an item or signing up for a service.
There are a number of basic attempts at such approach by
means of tracking cookies, however these efforts make up a
negligible portion of the current advertising revenue on the
Internet.
5https://adwords.google.com
Juels et al. [4] propose a cryptographic approach for re-
placing the pay-per-click model with one in which pay-per-
action (e.g., shopping) can attract premium rates and un-
successful clicks are discarded. in this system, the users
which make a purchase are identified by the network of ad-
vertisers as premium advertisers. The client browsers use a
coupon instantiated by third party cookies or issued by the
attestor upon redirection. The disadvantage of this method
is the ability of malicious attacker, possibly an advertiser, to
use a botnet and replay the coupons numerous times, for a
large number of cooperating publishers. This will then force
the syndicator either discount all those replays, or removing
those clients form the system with valid coupons. In both
cases, the advertisement income is minimized. It also allows
for the syndicator and the attestor (ad broker and middle
box) to profile the users accurately including their spending
budget. They also indicate that most standard click fraud
techniques remain unsolved today. Despite early suggestions
of this method, it has not been implemented on a large scale
as it requires trust between advertisers and publishers.
Some advertisers have suggested the use of anonymised
ISP data stream for verification of clicks and for better user
profiling. However such attempts have been unsuccessful
due to user privacy concerns. Privacy reasons also prevent
brokers from releasing their server logs and click data to
advertisers and their agents for deep inspection of the click
rates. Other solutions include use of human-invisible ads to
act as traps for botnets, however these can easily be ignored
by a simple visibility test in botnet design.
Immorlica et al. [3] analyze the click fraud learning algo-
rithms to compute the estimated click-through rate. They
focus on a situation in which there is just one ad slot, and
show that fraudulent clicks can not increase the expected
payment per impression by more than o(1) in a click-based
algorithm. However the complexity of the inferred algorithm
and the need for click-through rate estimation would make it
impractical as it also deviates form the pay per click model,
to pay per view model, which is the least desired model in
the modern advertisement world where bidding for space is
of critical importance.
6. FUTURE DIRECTIONS AND CONCLU-
SIONS
In this paper we presented a brief overview of the current
challenges in detection of click-fraud in online advertising.
We presented a simple detection strategy, Bluff ads. These
are sets of irrelevant ads displayed amongst user’s targeted
ads, which should never be clicked on. Together with thresh-
old detection, IP address monitoring and profile matching
techniques, bluff ads can be used to make it more compli-
cated for the botnet owners to train their software, or a
human operator. The bluff ads also may have a comfort fac-
tor of decreasing the user’s negative perceptions by reducing
the number of accurately targeted ads. We are working on
deployment of bluff ads on a large network ad service. We
are also hoping to design more sophisticated bluff ads in or-
der to avoid a trained bot to easily detect their irrelevancy
based on dictionary look-ups.
The current solutions to click-fraud do not detect attacks
by a malicious broker. In the current advertising models,
one has to fully trust the broker. There are proposals for
move away from a broker-centric model [2]. However un-
til a practical solution is deployed, research is required to
minimize the impact of click-fraud on businesses.
The click-fraud issue is a new and evolving area of work,
both by click-fraud investigation teams, and by attackers.
We need more datasets of ad clicks, better methods of bat-
tling attacks and large scale experiments on current methods
such as Bluff ads. There are click-fraud schemes in which the
publisher use only real clicks, but in a way that causes the
broker to pay when it should not need to do so [6]. These at-
tacks are done by hijacking search results form google.com
for example, and displaying results which are brought to the
user by google.com, while in reality redirecting the search
and click traffic through an attacker’s website and hence
claiming referral bonus from Google. In this way the user
does not notice any difference in results and the conventional
methods of fraud detection are hardly useful. More research
from the networking community is required to understand
and battle such attacks without relying on the user’s spy-
ware detection software.
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